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INTRODUCTION
On August 7, 1998, terrorists bombed United States embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing twelve Ameri-
cans and nearly three hundred Africans and wounding hundreds of
others.' The United States dispatched the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation ("FBI") and Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") to the
bombsites to gather evidence and search for suspects.' Secretary of
State Madeline Albright responded to these events by declaring war
against international terrorism' and vowed to use all resources neces-
sary to carry on the fight.4 Approximately two weeks later, based on
United States intelligence community information, the United States
1. See James Bennet, U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan and Afghan Targets
Tied To Terrorist Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al (describing events of
the embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi).
2. See Jane Perlez, FBI Chief Cites CIA Help In African Bombings Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1998, at A5.
3. See infra notes 38-63 and accompanying text (discussing the various defi-
nitions of international terrorism used by the United States). This Comment advo-
cates the FBI's definition of international terrorism since the FBI is the lead United
States agency investigating international terrorist acts. See infra note 38 (providing
the United States' definition of international terrorism).
4. See Tim Butcher & Hugh Davies, U.S. Strike Was 'First Blow in the War of
The Future' Washington Seeks Support for Long Campaign Against Global Ter-
rorism, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al (quoting Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright's description of terrorism as "the war of the future").
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preemptively struck5 terrorist targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan
with Tomahawk cruise missiles.
In the past, the United States has employed diplomatic,7 eco-
nomic,8 military,9 and legal'0 strategies to combat terrorism abroad.
Working within a larger framework of antiterrorism treaties and do-
mestic legislation, the United States has combined all of these strate-
gies to thwart the terrorist threat from overseas." The danger of ter-
rorism, however, increasingly threatens American lives and property
5. See Bennet, supra note 1, at Al (claiming that the United States took de-
fensive measures against future terrorist aggression against American targets). Two
examples of preemptive strikes by the United States against terrorist targets oc-
curred when the United States bombed Libya in 1986 and Iraq in 1990. See id. at
All.
6. See id. at A17 (describing the United States' attacks against terrorist camps
in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical weapons manufacturing facility in Khar-
toum, Sudan).
7. See Public Report of the Vice President' s Task Force on Combating Ter-
rorism, reprinted in LEGAL RESPONSES To INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; U.S.
PROCEDURAL AsPECTs 307-08 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) (noting that the
United States is a party to many multilateral and bilateral agreements regarding ter-
rorism abroad with nations such as Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the
United Kingdom).
8. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat.
1541 (prohibiting trade with Iran and Libya due to terrorist activities sponsored by
those states); see also Meghan McCurdy, Comment, Unilateral Sanctions With A
Twist: The Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 397, 408-11
(1997) (discussing the United States' use of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of
1996 as a tool to fight international terrorism).
9. See Serge Schemenn, How Can Terror Best Be Combated?, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 1988, at All (detailing the United States' use of military strikes against
terrorist targets in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the Sudan).
10. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 855 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.;
most recently amended by Pub. L. No. 103-415 (1994)) (extending United States
extraterritorial jurisdiction to foreign nationals involving injuries to Americans in
acts of terrorism); see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (extending the legal means of fighting terror-
ism "by strengthened penalties, restricted appeals, and granted standing to victims
in suits against foreign countries that sponsor terrorism").
11. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text (identifying past United
States antiterrorism legislation).
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as terrorists seek more powerful weapons and increasingly lethal
tactics to achieve their goals.12
The United States classifies international terrorism as a crime and
applies legal means as the primary tool to fight it. 3 Recently, how-
ever, the United States has shifted away from reactive counter-
terrorism law enforcement methods' 4 and towards more proactive"
techniques to fight international terrorism.'6 The United States now
perceives terrorist acts as acts of war.'7 In this regard-particularly in
12. See Counter-terrorism Policy Hearings Before Senate Judiciary Comm.,
105th Cong. 123 (1998) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation) (characterizing the new overseas terrorist threat as more deadly,
technologically advanced, and organized).
13. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing the United States'
legal definition and classification of international terrorism).
14. See RONALD D. CRELSTEN & ALEX P. SCHMID, WESTERN RESPONSES To
TERRORISM 310, 310 (1993) (defining "reactive counter-terrorism policy" as short-
sighted, incident-driven, and focused on past events), Reactive counter-terrorism
strategies seek to deter and punish terrorist acts through legal means such as law
enforcement and prosecutions. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, LEGAL RESPONSES To
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS xlii (1988).
15. See CRELSTEN & SCHMID, supra note 14, at 310 (defining "proactive" re-
sponses to international terrorism as long-term, preventive, and seeking to watch
and follow the terrorist before he or she strikes). In this Comment, the term "pro-
active" refers to the increasingly aggressive law enforcement counter-terrorism ef-
forts of the United States. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States
Involvement in The International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 813, 869 (1993). Proactive counter-terrorism strategies can in-
volve reprisals, preemption, and retribution through military means. See generally
BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at 310-12. A discussion of these specific strategies is
outside the scope of this Comment.
16. See U.S. War on Terrorism, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6, 1998, at A6 (observing
that President Clinton intends to move away from a passive response toward ter-
rorism and retaliate when the United States is attacked); see also Abraham D. So-
faer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism,
the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 95 (1989) (stating that
the United States should move away from a passive antiterrorism strategy by em-
bracing more active, preventive, and preemptive tactics); Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (extending
the FBI's law enforcement jurisdiction over terrorist acts against Americans
abroad); 143 CONG. REC. H651-03 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1997) (extending proactive
measures in international counter-terrorism law enforcement to intelligence, crisis
management, and coordination with other federal agencies).
17. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text (suggesting that terrorism
abroad is an act of war against the United States).
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light of the participation of numerous governmental agencies in
counter-terrorism activities '8-the expansion of law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and CIA, raises important ju-
risdictional questions. 9 Additionally, such expansion may impact
domestic law as well as the field of international law enforcement."'
Part I of this Comment addresses the changing nature of interna-
tional terrorism and its impact on law enforcement agencies and
other antiterrorism actors. It also discusses why the United States has
moved away from its passive legal strategy to combat terrorist acts
overseas and assesses how United States legislation provides a basis
for antiterrorism agencies to operate counter-terrorism strategies
abroad. Furthermore, Part I evaluates whether the definition of inter-
national terrorism is so inclusive that agencies such as the FBI and
CIA can properly fight terrorism abroad without overlapping juris-
dictions.
Part II explores the basis for expanding the extraterritorial juris-
diction of the United States in relation to the growing authority and
activities of law enforcement and intelligence bureaus and agencies.
Part Il examines the potential implications of law enforcement
counter-terrorism activities overseas, considering consequences such
as infringement upon sovereignty, adverse reciprocity in the interna-
tional community, and the compromise of international and domestic
law. Part IV comments on necessary improvements in United States
international terrorism legislation and cooperative efforts, and offers
recommendations that address potential legal consequences of
United States law enforcement activities overseas.
18. See infra notes 113-27 (discussing the roles of various agencies involved in
counter-terrorism activities).
19. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text (analyzing the implications
of expanding jurisdiction of the FBI and CIA in response to the changing nature of
terrorism overseas).
20. See David B. Kopel & Joseph Olsen, Preventing A Reign of Terror: Civil
Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 247,
329-31 (1996) (identifying some barriers to the expansion of law enforcement
agencies overseas and their impact on international precedent); see also infra notes
149-188 and accompanying text (discussing potential ramifications for expanding
law enforcement jurisdiction overseas).
1999] 1477
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I. BACKGROUND
The United States has historically initiated a legal response as its
first reaction to international terrorist activities.2' Legal mechanisms
such as extradition and prosecution are primary examples of legal re-
sponses used by the United States against international terrorists."
The United States, however, has never relied solely on legal means
to combat terrorism because legal strategies often prove to be insuf-
ficient mechanisms for deterring future terrorist attacks. 3 Further-
more, due to the seriousness of the new and potentially devastating
terrorist threat, 4 there is an urgent need to take action before a ter-
rorist attack occurs rather than respond to an attack with legal ac-
tion.25
21. See Lawrence A. Steckman & Timothy D. Aldridge, Terrorism, Ideology
and Rules of Law, I TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 256 n.169 (1990) (stating that
Americans are receptive to the use of law as a means of fighting terrorism abroad).
Americans assume that the use of law will be effective in suppressing and regulat-
ing the conduct of terrorists abroad because Americans themselves respect the use
of law and expect that others will as well. See id.
22. See Omnibus Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399,
100 Stat. 855 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.; most re-
cently amended by Pub. L. No. 103-415 (1994)) (providing a basis for the United
States to prosecute terrorists for acts committed against Americans overseas); see
also Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International En-
forcement of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 64-71 (1990) (noting the
United States efforts to renegotiate extradition treaties in order to prosecute inter-
national terrorists).
23. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at xlii (stating that in cases of ideologically-
motivated terrorism, legal deterrence proves ineffective); see also Timothy F.
Malloy, Military Responses To Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 287
(1987) (explaining that extradition treaties and domestic legislation are difficult to
implement because of political pressures and loopholes in the extradition process).
24. See NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE, PROACTIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM:
REPRISALS, PREEMPTION, AND RETRIBUTION IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 219-
20 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1990) (arguing that legal means do not conform to
the new nature of the international terrorism threat, and the legal strategy does not
deter international terrorists from acting).
25. See 143 CONG. REC. H651-03 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1997) (describing law en-
forcement proactive measures as "prevention, immediate incident response, and
post-incident response").
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A. INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT
The perceived threat that foreign terrorism poses to the United
States impacts the laws and policies used to thwart it." Although ter-
rorist attacks against the United States have decreased in recent
years,7 terrorists now use more sophisticated and devastating weap-
ons,2 seeking targets that inflict the greatest damage on human life
and property. 29 Terrorists now look to multi-millionaires -"' and entire
nations for financial support." They then use this money to acquire
and use nuclear, chemical, and biological12 weapons against the
26. See Agencies' Efforts To Fight Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice of tie House
Comm. Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. (1998), available in LEXIS on-
line, Cong. Rec. [hereinafter Agencies' Efforts To Fight Terrorism] (statement of
Richard Davis, Director of National Security Analysis, National Security and In-
ternational Affairs Division) (asserting that since the 1970s, the United States'
policy toward terrorism abroad has evolved concurrently with the perception and
nature of the terrorist threat).
27. See U.S Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: Annual Reports from
1995, 1996, and 1997 (visited Sept. 7, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/
terrorism/gt_index.html> (finding that the number of international terrorist acts de-
creased between 1995 and 1996); see also Agencies' Efforts To Fight Terrorism,
supra note 26 (statement of Larry C. Johnson) (noting that international terrorism
has fallen to a historic low).
28. See Counter-terrorisin Policy Hearings Before Senate Judiciary Comm.,
supra note 12 (announcing that the trend of international terrorism is to inflict the
maximum amount of destruction to property and human life and create a sense of
terror to gain media recognition).
29. See id. (noting that the purpose of foreign terrorist attacks is to inflict as
many casualties as possible and cause significant destruction to property).
30. See Tim Weiner, Man With Mission Takes On the U.S. At Far-Flung
Sights, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al (noting that Osama bin Laden, president
of "Terrorist University," provides major assistance to terrorist organizations and
Islamic groups from his $250 million fortune).
31. See Counter-terrorism Policy Hearings Before Senate Judiciary Comm.,
supra note 12 (distinguishing the threat of international terrorism into three parts,
including state-sponsored terrorists, terrorist organizations, and loosely affiliated
extremists). Freeh explains how these three types of terrorists support their activi-
ties through financial and logistic means. See id.
32. See Robert Chesney, National Insecurity: Nuclear Material Availabilit
"
and Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 29, 61-62
(1997) (recognizing a demand among terrorists, at home and abroad, to acquire nu-
clear, biological, and chemical weapons to increase the deadliness of their attacks).
Now that the Cold War is over, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
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United States.33 Moreover, terrorists presently use conventional
weapons that are increasingly technically advanced and more diffi-
cult to detect.3 4 The advanced weapons available to terrorists pose an
alarming national security threat, providing terrorists with the ability
to destabilize entire regions by disrupting peaceful resolutions of
conflicts35 and to inflict massive harm against United States citizens
and property.36 Because of tactical and weaponry developments made
by terrorists over the past decade, the United States now searches for
solutions to the terrorist dilemma by passing legislation that adopts a
preemptive strategy against the new, more advanced overseas terror-
ist threat.3
7
cal weapons around the globe has likely increased. See id.
33. See Agencies' Efforts To Fight Terrorism, supra note 26 (statement of
Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis for the National Security and
International Affairs Division) (describing the danger posed to the United States by
the sale and distribution of unconventional weapons to terrorists).
34. See 144 CONG. REC. S2989 (1998) (delineating the weapons that terrorists
have in their arsenals).
35. See World Wide Threat To National Security, Hearings Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Intelligence on Current and Projected National Security Threats
to the United States, 105th Cong. 50 (1998) [hereinafter World Wide Threat To
National Security] (statement of Phyllis E. Oakely, Assistant Secretary of State)
(warning that terrorists abroad seek not only to disrupt resolution to the Arab-
Israeli peace process, but also intend to interfere with United States interests in
South America by creating regional instability and opposition).
36. See Counter-terrorism: Hearings on Counter-terrorism, Before Senate Ap-
propriations Comm., 105th Cong. 12 (1997) (statement of Louis Freeh, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation) (noting that terrorism is a threat to the United
States' national security); see also Terror Has Become The World's Biggest Prob-
lem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at A5 (acknowledging that President Clinton de-
fined terrorism as a prime concern of the United States in his address to the United
Nations); Steven W. Krohne, The United States and the World Need an Interna-
tional Criminal Court as an Alley in the War Against Terrorism, 8 IND. INT'L L.
REv. 159, 160 (1997) (statement of Secretary of State Warren Christopher) (stating
that "President Clinton has rightly identified terrorism as one of the most important
security challenges [America faces] in the wake of the Cold War").
37. See Randell K. Miller, The Limits of the International Law Enforcement
After Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 867, 868 n.9
(1997) (describing how increasing threats of criminal activity and international ter-
rorism caused the United States to enforce its laws over international boundaries);
see also ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS; THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 76 (1993) (pre-
dicting that the new technological developments available to terrorists, such as
more discrete and potent weapons and explosives, will result in fresh, law en-
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B. DEFINING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The changing nature of the terrorist threat overseas has forced
American policymakers to reconsider the characterization and defi-
nition of international terrorism. The United States defines interna-
tional terrorism as the "unlawful use of violence against the United
States, citizens of the United States or any other nation, outside the
boundaries of the United States, apparently intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population, influence government policy, or to af-
fect the conduct of a government for political or social objectives."'
State agencies, however, have not universally adopted this defini-
tion39 because it does not adequately address the changing nature of
the terrorist threat overseas in two specific ways.4 First, the present
forcement techniques, new international conventions, and new realms of interna-
tional law enforcement tactics and activities).
38. Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2250 (codified at
18 U.S.C. sec. 2331 (Supp. 1991)). Defining terrorism as:
(A) violent acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within
the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appearing to be intended--(i)
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a govern-
ment by intimidation or coercion; (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assas-
sination or kidnapping; (C) occur outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, or transcend national Boundaries in terms of the means by which they are ac-
complished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
Id.
39. See Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisprudential and
Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 240-44 (1995) (ob-
serving different definitions of terrorism). The United States Department of De-
fense defines terrorism as "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence
by revolutionary organizations against individuals or property with the intention of
coercing or intimidating governments or against societies, often for political or
ideological purposes." Id. at 240 n.3. The FBI defines terrorism as "the unlawful
use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a gov-
ernment, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives." Id. The United States Department of State defines terrorism
as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated by noncombatants tar-
gets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents." Id.
40. See Dave Martella, Defending The Land of the Free and the Home of the
Fearful: The Use of Classified Information to Deport Suspected Terrorists, 7 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 951, 969 (1992) (arguing that law enforcement officials do
not strictly comply with the definition of terrorism as a crime). In instances con-
cerning immigration law, the definition of international terrorism is not limited to
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definition of international terrorism subjectively defines a "terrorist"
and does not establish consistent criteria to classify acts of terrorism
• • 41
as criminal. Second, the United States increasingly characterizes
terrorist attacks as acts of war because of their devastating conse-
quences and the threat to national security. 2 For law enforcement
and intelligence agencies, new developments concerning the terrorist
menace and an indeterminate definition present inconsistent objec-
tives and allow for the possibility of miscalculation and inadequate
responses to terrorism abroad. 3
1. Terrorism as a Crime
Classifying international terrorism as a crime creates a dilemma
because, "[a] criminal act of terrorism to some will embody a legiti-
mate act of self-determination to others."" At times, the United
States, like other nations, has not strictly applied the definition of
international terrorism to foreign acts, recognizing some terrorist acts
criminal acts, but may also incorporate political beliefs. See id. at 969-70 (ques-
tioning law enforcement's discretion under the definition of international terror-
ism). But see Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational
Terrorism: An Overview, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 117, 147 (1986) (suggesting that
defining international terrorism as a crime ignores terrorist activities as a low-level
conflict). By classifying terrorism as a crime rather than a war, the United States
may miscalculate its approach to terrorism and improperly allocate resources
against it. See id. at 148.
41. See Douglas Kash, Abductions of Terrorists in International Airspace and
on the High Seas, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 65, 72-73 (1993) (arguing that although agen-
cies' definitions of international terrorism are closely worded, the lack of uniform-
ity among definitions prevents an adequate calculation as to whom is a terrorist);
see also infra note 45 and accompanying text (exemplifying the subjective defini-
tion of international terrorism).
42. See Butcher & Davies, supra note 4, at Al (quoting Secretary Albright
classifying terrorism as war); see also infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text
(discussing terrorism as an act of war).
43. See General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism; Federal Agencies'
Efforts To Implement National Policy and Strategy 16 (visited Dec. 24, 1998)
<http://www.gao.gov/reports.htm> (explaining that different definitions of terror-
ism cause agencies to take a variety of counter-terrorism approaches).
44. CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR., INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 12 (1990) (state-
ment of Christopher C. Joyner); see also BRIAN M. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: THE OTHER WORLD WAR IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 29 (Charles
W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1990) (stating that the problem of defining international terror-
ism has led to the cliche "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter").
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as legitimate claims of groups seeking self-determination."5 This
method of defining terrorism is based on a political standard that
leaves American foreign policymakers the discretion to decide which
violent acts are acceptable*6 and allows for the subjective definition
of some terrorist groups as revolutionaries."
Currently, United States law defines international terrorism as a
criminal act," classifying acts of violence objectively rather than
rendering subjective and potentially arbitrary political decisions."
This objective test for defining terrorist acts abroad is not applied in
every case, however, resulting in the inconsistent classification of
terrorism as a crime." It also empowers law enforcement agencies
responsible for determining who is a terrorist by granting them wide
discretion to make subjective determinations."
45. See Beres, supra note 39, at 248 (suggesting how the definition of interna-
tional terrorism can be manipulated or politicized). The Cold War between the
United States and the Soviet Union best exemplifies this dilemma regarding the
definition of international terrorism. See id. The United States perceived acts of
violence against the pro-Soviet states as lawful, while labeling insurgent move-
ments against nations sympathetic to the United States as terrorist. See id.
46. See id. at 24849 (arguing that classifying terrorists according to national
interests is arbitrary and capricious).
47. See id. at 240 (arguing that the United States classifies freedom fighters and
terrorists arbitrarily according to the best interest of the United States).
48. See Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 2331 (West Supp. 1991)
(criminalizing international terrorism).
49. See Martella, supra note 40, at 965-70 (noting that international terrorism
can be defined under an objective test rather than as a political decision).
50. See Beres, supra note 39, at 240 (arguing that strictly defining international
terrorism would classify the United States as a supporter of terrorism because of its
support for the anti-Castro insurgency in Cuba and the Contra insurgency in Nica-
ragua).
51. See Martella, supra note 40, at 969 (asserting that the FBI has the power,
under its present definition of terrorism, to investigate aliens according to political
ideals on mere suspicion of terrorist activities). In instances of immigration, these
agencies may determine terrorist activities without the commission of a crime. See
id. at 969-70.
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2. Terrorism as an Act of War
Little more than an ambiguous threshold exists to differentiate the
level of violence distinguishing terrorist acts from acts of war.52 This
ambiguity results in inconsistent definitions of international terrorism
that can potentially complicate uniform law enforcement responses
to terrorist threats abroad. 3 It is the definition of international terror-
ism that is often used to determine which agency is best suited to im-
plement an antiterrorist strategy. 4 Without a clear universal defini-
tion it is extremely difficult to render this agency determination.
In light of the recent terrorist activities overseas, the United States
increasingly perceives transnational terrorism as acts of war." Like
an enemy in a war, terrorists aim to kill large numbers of combatants
and non-combatants and attack strategic governmental and non-
governmental targets in an attempt to damage the United States and
disrupt international stability.5 6 After the bombings in East Africa,
Secretary of State Madeline Albright labeled international terrorism
as "the war of the future.57
52. See LIVINGSTONE, supra note 24, at 240 (commenting on the different in-
terpretations of international terrorism).
53. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 16 (finding that there is
no universal definition of international terrorism among agencies fighting terror-
ism); 144 CONG. REC. E177, E178 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Skelton) (stating that agencies implement incoherent and disconnected strategies
against international terrorism, resulting in a flawed policy).
54. See Law Enforcement Techniques, (NPR Morning Edition radio broadcast,
July 6, 1998) (distinguishing the appropriate responses to international terrorist
acts based on how international terrorism is defined). Many argue that if interna-
tional terrorism is a crime, the FBI is the appropriate agency assigned to fight it.
See id. But, if international terrorism is perceived as a low scale war, the CIA, the
military, or the State Department arguably are the best options for counter-terrorist
measures. See id.
55. See 144 CONG. REC. S2989, SS3002-3 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Domenici) (emphasizing that the international terrorist threat is not the
same as in the past and depicts warlike qualities).
56. See id.
57. Butcher & Davies, supra note 4, at Al; see also U.S. War on Terrorism,
supra note 16, at A6 (explaining that Clinton's campaign against terrorism is not
yet fully defined, although the United States will clearly not remain a passive vic-
tim if attacked); Adam Garfinkle, U.S. Right to Fight Fire with Fire; Terrorists
Unmoved by Legal Approach, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 1998, at E12 (stating that
international terrorists such as Osama bin Laden are not deterred by American le-
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Although terrorism does not exactly comport with the definition of
war,58 scholars classify it as irregular or low intensity warfare that in-
volves armed attacks against both government and non-government
personnel for political purposes.59 Thus, approaching terrorism as a
war may be a more appropriate tack because the military is better
equipped for low intensity warfare and is not limited by restrictions
placed on law enforcement.6' Nonetheless, the United States uses
agencies such as the FBI and CIA, which are limited in jurisdictional
and resource capacity, to treat and fight all overseas terrorist acts as
criminal acts rather than as acts of war.62 Scholars argue that the lack
of agreement as to whether international terrorism is a crime or an
act of war adversely impacts preventive and responsive measures to
international terrorism.63
gal mechanisms).
58. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1583 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "war" as
"hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states,
or rulers, or between citizens in the same nation or state").
59. See Larschan, supra note 40, at 147 (characterizing terrorism as an armed
conflict as opposed to a criminal act); see also Beres, supra note 39, at 239 (argu-
ing that the definition of terrorism may be construed as criminal attacks on non-
combatants, while at the same time classified as guerrilla warfare that necessitates
a military response); Malloy, supra note 23, at 298 (statement of Alberto R. Coil)
(observing that acts of terrorism overlap with traditional notions of war). Terrorist
attacks that killed United States military personnel in Lebanon in 1983 and El Sal-
vador in 1985 are instances where terrorism can be classified as acts of war. See id.
60. See Malloy, supra note 23, at 299 (asserting that the military should destroy
terrorist planning and training facilities in nations harboring those terrorists).
61. See id. (arguing that the use of military action against terrorism as a form of
low intensity warfare would be more effective and beneficial in long-term deter-
rence, short-term prevention, and punishment than political, diplomatic, economic,
and legal responses).
62. See 135 CONG. REC. S8130-31 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (discussing the possible structural changes for the FBI and CIA to meet
the changing nature of terrorism abroad).
63. See Sofaer, supra note 16, at 90 (arguing that to fight international terror-
ism successfully, terrorism must be recognized as a national security threat and not
just a crime); see also Larschan, supra note 40, at 139. Larschan states:
Transnational terrorism is nothing less then warfare against the United States and other
governments. The various groups comprising the international terrorist network sup-
ported by a handful of states are conducting low-level armed conflict against demo-
cratic societies. And yet, even with the recognition that armed conflict is being waged,
western states continue to rely upon the ineffective and increasingly impractical crimi-
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C. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM OVERSEAS
In order to create comprehensive and well-reasoned antiterrorism
legislation, Congress must obtain a clear understanding of the na-
tion's goal and objectives in the fight against terrorism.' Presently,
the United States' legislative responses to acts of terrorism abroad
are aptly characterized as ad hoc and fragmented.6' No congressional
legislation comprehensively addresses international terrorism.6 In-
stead, such legislation slowly evolves as the nature of terrorism
changes.7 This legislation is often piecemeal, arising out of rapid and
nal law approach in dealing with transnational terrorism.
Id.
64. See Hearings Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998), avail-
able in LEXIS online, Cong. Rec. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (stating that before Con-
gress creates antiterrorism legislation, it must have a definite understanding of the
nation's objectives and standards for implementing those objectives); see also 144
CONG. REC. E717 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Skelton) (observing
inefficiencies in present legislation that allocates resources for counter-terrorism
efforts). Rep. Skelton noted that no "regular government-wide collection and re-
view of funding data exists; the government failed to establish apparent priorities;
no assessment process exist to coordinate and focus government efforts; and no
government office or entity maintains authority to enforce coordination." See id.
65. See Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing Inter-
national Terrorists To Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
726, 746 n.23 (1992) (describing the United States' legislative response to terror-
ism as reactive, reflexive, and haphazard); see also Richard Cummings, The PLO
Case: Terrorism, Statutory Interpretation, and Conflicting Obligations Under Do-
mestic and Public International Law, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 25, 28
(1989) (noting that the Antiterrorism Act of 1987 was "passed in the heat of pas-
sion not subject to congressional hearings nor to examination by any congressional
committee"); Robert A. Friedlander, The U.S. Legislative Approach, in LEGAL
RESPONSES To INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, supra
note 7, at 3, 20 (describing the congressional response to terrorism as piecemeal,
reactive, and crisis-driven).
66. See Roberta Smith, America Tries To Come To Terms With Terrorism: The
United States Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British
Anti-terrorism Law and International Response, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
249, 283-84 (1997) (finding that the United States does not pass specific legisla-
tion that focuses on international terrorism, but rather incorporates antiterrorism
measures into other laws). But see Kash, supra note 41, at 77 (arguing that the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 is sufficiently com-
prehensive in addressing terrorism overseas).
67. See 144 CONG. REC. S2989, S3002-003 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Domenici) (affirming that the threat of international terrorism is still
prominent and that the federal government must take necessary actions to meet this
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passionate responses to domestic and international terrorist acts."
Moreover, there is a clear lack of consensus among policymakers on
the definition of international terrorism and the exact threato it
70poses.
threat). Senator Domenici notes that international terrorism evolves with the in-
creasing use of technological weaponry, biological, chemical, and nuclear weap-
ons, and a more deadly strategy. See id. at S3002. Furthermore, terrorists are be-
coming more multifarious and transnational, and seek to take increasing advantage
of the United States' open, democratic society. See id. at S3003; see also Nadel-
mann, supra note 22, at 76 (concluding that the technological advancement of ter-
rorist weapons impacts international responses to terrorism).
68. See 133 CONG. REC. S13,852 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Benjamin) (expressing that Congress did not thoroughly consider the Anti-
terrorism Act of 1987 as there were no hearings on the legislation, nor was it con-
sidered in committee); see also 141 CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Dole) (responding to the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing one
week later by introducing the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("ADEPA") is an example of
legislation enacted in light of a terrorist attack. See Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. After the Okla-
homa City bombing, President Clinton signed into law a bill with strong bipartisan
support that addressed both domestic and international terrorist issues. See Jennifer
A. Beall, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996's Anwer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 694 (1998) (stating
that AEDPA and the Omnibus Counter-terrorism Act of 1995 were responses to
domestic terrorist attacks).
69. See Counter-terrorismn Policy Hearings Before Senate Judiciary Comm.,
supra note 12 (defining the international terrorist threat against the United States as
foreign-based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States,
whose activities transcend national boundaries). Freeh claims that over the past
several years the threat of international terrorism has increased and will continue to
increase in the future in the form of state-sponsored terrorism, formalized terrorists
groups, and loosely-affiliated international Islamic extremists. See id.; see also
Neil C. Livingstone, Conspiracy in International Affairs: Terrorism: Conspiracy,
Myth and Reality, 22 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. J. 1, 13 (1998) (citing sharp divi-
sions among policymakers over the perception of the international terrorist threat
as one of the primary reasons why the United States is unsuccessful in combating
terrorism). But see, Kopel & Olsen, supra note 20, at 256-57 (asserting that there is
no United States domestic or international terrorism crisis); Stephen Rosenfeld,
Terrorism Oversimplified, WASH. POST, June 29, 1984, at 19A (arguing that ter-
rorism abroad is not the greatest danger facing America).
70. See Friedlander, supra note 65, at 20-25 (noting that the United States does
not have a fully agreed upon definition of terrorism and that if the United States is
to carry out criminal legislative directives against terrorism, there must be a uni-
form, coherent definition); see also EDWARD S. HERMAN & GERRY O'SULLIVAN,
THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY: THE EXPERTS AND INSTITUTIONS THAT SHAPE OUR
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
This lack of consensus among policymakers is reflected in existing
United States international antiterrorism legislation. Antiterrorism
legislation has tended to focus on limited objectives,' copy provi-
sions of multilateral treaties, or simply to mix with current domestic
terrorism legislation." Furthermore, agencies have articulated and
tailored their own unique defmitions of international terrorism for
their own specific purposes.74 In any case, despite scattered and
sometimes muddled legislation responding to terrorism abroad, Con-
gress now seeks to expand law enforcement's jurisdiction overseas to
provide agencies with additional power to combat terrorism 5
VIEW OF TERROR 44 (1989) (describing the definition of terrorism as "murky," al-
lowing western countries to name terrorists at their discretion).
71. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 855 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.;
most recently amended by Pub. L. No. 103-415 (1994)) (extending United States
jurisdiction to foreign nationals involved in acts that injured American citizens and
cases where foreign nationals were prosecuted for involvement in acts of interna-
tional terrorism, such as attempting to kill, killing, assaulting, or making a violent
attack upon an American national); see also Brandon Chabner, The Omnibus Dip-
lomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Prescribing and Enforcing United
States Law Against Terrorist Violence Overseas, 37 UCLA L. REV. 985, 985
(1990) (stating that the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986 addresses United States security concerns regarding the safety of its diplo-
mats and citizens abroad).
72. See Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Acts of Hijacking,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 (prohibiting terrorist hijacking of airplanes and sea
vessels); see also Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565 (outlawing aircraft sabo-
tage by international terrorists).
73. See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (responding to insufficiencies in United States do-
mestic and international terrorism laws after the Oklahoma City bombing).
74. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 16 (observing that differ-
ent definitions of terrorism can be a source for divergent policies among counter-
terrorism actors).
75. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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II. AGENCIES ABROAD: FOUNDATION FOR
UNITED STATES EXTRATERRATORIAL
ACTIVITIES
A. UNITED STATES BASIS FOR EXPANDING EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
Extraterritorial jurisdiction 76 allows a country to exercise jurisdic-
tion over criminal acts outside its own borders." Extraterritorial ju-
risdiction over an alleged offender of a nation's laws is often granted
under extradition 78 treaties between two nations.7 Under international
law, an individual country defines its own extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.0 The legitimacy of these acts then limits the extension of a na-
tion's extraterritorial jurisdiction, with legitimacy determined by the
international community's acceptance of those acts over which a na-
tion exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction.8 Countries often use the
76. See BLACK'S LAWv DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction" as "juridical power that extends beyond the physical limits of a
particular state or country"); see also RESTATENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES sees. 402, 403 (1987) (setting forth limi-
tations on a nation's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
77. See Adam W. Weger, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under International
Law: The Yunis Decision as a Model for the Prosecution of Terrorism in US.
Courts, 22 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 409, 412-13 (1991) (explaining the concept
of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law as applied by the United
States).
78. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "extradition"
as "the surrender by one state or country to another of an individual accused or
convicted of an offense outside its own territory and within the territory of juris-
diction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the
surrender"); see also General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 54-55 (dis-
cussing the United States' use of extradition treaties to apprehend terrorists abroad
under Presidential Decision Directive 39).
79. See Nadelmann, supra note 15, at 832-36 (noting that the United States ex-
ercises its extraterritorial jurisdiction over international terrorists through extradi-
tion treaties).
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES sec. 404 (1987) (allowing states to set extraterritorial criminal
sanctions against conduct that may affect the states security, integrity, or sover-
eignty).
81. See id. see. 404 reporters' notes (1987) (noting that not all principles estab-
lished under extraterritorial jurisdiction by nations are accepted under international
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expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction as a method to extend their
right to prosecute international criminal acts.82
1. Justifying Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Three international law principles support the legal theory of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction: the universality principle, the passive per-
sonality principle, and the protective principle.83 First, the universal-
ity principle is premised on the finding that acts of terrorism are
crimes against humanity, thus allowing a state to prosecute an of-
fender on behalf of the world.84 Second, the passive personality prin-
ciple allows the extension of jurisdiction over offenders who victim-
ize citizens of the particular nation seeking jurisdiction." Third, the
protective principle provides jurisdiction on the basis of a perceived
threat to national security, integrity, or sovereignty 6 by an extrater-
ritorial offense.87
law); see also Jimmy Gurule, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible
Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L COMP. L.
REv. 457, 469 (1994) (stating that the international community usually recognizes
the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction "to protect and preserve vital national
interests").
82. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Juris-
diction, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; U.S. PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS, supra note 7, at 131, 139 n.26 (arguing that some nations, such as the
United States in international narcotic cases, go beyond the international norms of
extradition treaties).
83. See id. at 139-40 (defining the universality principle, the protective princi-
ple, and the passive personality principle). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES sec. 402 (Tentative Draft No.
6, 1985) (setting forth the rule of reasonableness for the bases of extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
84. See Blakesley, supra note 82, at 142-53 (explaining the universality princi-
ple and its application to international terrorism). Nations can use the universality
principle for extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorism if it is universally accepted
by nations that terrorism is a crime. See id. at 140.
85. See id. at 172-78 (providing a definition of the passive personality principle
and explaining its application to international terrorism).
86. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "sover-
eignty" as "the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any inde-
pendent state is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will").
87. See Blakesley, supra note 82, at 164-72 (defining and applying the protec-
tive principle to international terrorism).
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2. Applying Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Theories to Terrorism
The extension of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction over
acts of terrorism abroad arguably stems from all three of these prin-
ciples." The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986 ("the Act") clearly meets the requirements of both the passive
personality and protective principles." The United States may justify
jurisdiction over individuals abroad under the passive personality
principle because the Act extends jurisdiction to terrorist acts that di-
rectly harm United States citizens." Moreover, the Act satisfies ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction under the protective principle by defining
terrorist acts as those aimed to coerce or threaten government pol-
icy.9 1
If terrorism is universally recognized as a crime around the
globe-such as the crime of genocide-the United States may also
extend jurisdiction over terrorists under the universal jurisdiction
principle on the basis of hoste humani generis.9- Accordingly, these
three principles provide the framework for United States extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over acts of international terrorism."l
These theories provide a sweeping foundation for the United
States to exercise jurisdiction over terrorists abroad. There are few
restrictions on the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and thus the
United States has the opportunity to expand its law enforcement
88. See Patrick L. Donnelly, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terror-
ism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Securin' and Anti-terrorism Act of
1986, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 599, 599 (1987) (concluding that the Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Anti-terrorism Act satisfies both the universality and passive
personality principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction). But see Blakesley, supra note
82, at 177 (arguing that the passive personality principle is not widely accepted in
American courts).
89. See Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 855 (1986).
90. See id. (declaring international terrorism to involve violent acts dangerous
to American citizens abroad).
91. See id. (providing that the United States extend its jurisdiction over acts
that kill or injure American citizens or acts intended to influence a government by
intimidation or coercion).
92. See Blakesley, supra note 82, at 141-54 (stating that the universality prin-
ciple can be a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction).
93. See id. at 139-78 (finding that the basis for the United States justification
for extraterritorial jurisdiction is founded under these principles).
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presence internationally.14 There is concern, however, that the Act
provides the United States with broad and unobstructed powers to
extend jurisdiction overseas.95 The over-extension of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by Congress, could produce unfavorable implications on
international law.96 As a result, the far-reaching United States extra-
territorial jurisdiction over international terrorists presents potential
consequences such as future reciprocal application by foreign na-
tions,9 7 unfettered law enforcement activities abroad, and possible in-
fringement upon the sovereignty of other nations.'
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES sec. 432 (1987) (discussing the minimal limitations on extraterritorial ju-
risdiction).
95. See Donnelly, supra note 88, at 617 (describing the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States as overly extensive); see also Richard Pregent, Presiden-
tial Authority To Displace Customary International Law, 129 MIL. L. REV. 77,
101-05 (1990) (arguing that the enabling statutes of the FBI, Department of Jus-
tice, and State Department provide the President of the United States with the po-
tential ability to violate international law).
96. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 16, 38-42 (1989) [hereinafter FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad]
(statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, United States Department of
State) (noting possible infringement of international law by granting extraterritorial
jurisdiction to FBI agents overseas). But see id. at 43-45 (statement of Oliver B.
Revell, Associate Deputy Director-Investigations, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
(arguing that the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the FBI will not result in the in-
fringement of international law due to the cooperation and consent of other na-
tions).
97. See Donnelly, supra note 88, at 618 (arguing that other nations could po-
tentially reciprocate the limitless extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by the
United States under the passive personality principle). By setting a precedent under
international law in creating long-arm statutes reaching individuals around the
globe, the United States may subject itself to another nation's law enforcement,
investigating acts against its nationals on United States soil. See id.
98. See Jost Delbruck, A More Effective International Law or a New "World
Law"?-Some Aspects of the Development of International Law in a Changing
International System, 68 IND. L.J. 705, 715 (1993) (noting that the expansion of a
nation's jurisdiction could potentially infringe upon sovereignty). Similar to inter-
national human rights enforcement, the extension of law enforcement against in-
ternational terrorism may result in infringement upon sovereignty of uncooperative
states. See id. (noting violations of sovereignty arising out of the international en-
forcement of human rights).
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B. LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES UNDER
EXPANDED EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Based upon broad powers of extraterritorial jurisdiction,9 Ameri-
can law enforcement agencies are authorized to investigate, appre-
hend, and prosecute terrorists who violate United States law." His-
torically, the United States primarily exercised extraterritorial
jurisdiction over criminal acts involving Canada and Mexico."' The
twentieth century, however, witnessed an increase in extraterritorial
activities by United States law enforcement involving other coun-
tries.' ° Activities in the areas of narcotics dealing and money laun-
dering by the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") and the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS")' provided a springboard for other law en-
forcement agencies, such as the FBI, to fight foreign terrorism.'"'
Presently, the FBI has prime responsibility in the United States for
investigating terrorist activities.' ' In addition to its grant of authority
under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986, the FBI also has extraterritorial jurisdiction to combat terror-
ism under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"). 3 6 The AEDPA authorizes the FBI to act as the lead
99. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 855.
100. See Blakesley, supra note 82, at 178-79 (recognizing the applicability of
the three principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction to international terrorism).
101. See NADELMANN, supra note 37, at 15-102 (providing a history of United
States law enforcement overseas).
102. See id. at 54-104 (citing the expansion of United States international law
enforcement activities due to increased drug trafficking and financial crime).
103. See generally id. at 103-88 (contrasting the United States use of the DEA,
IRS, and other law enforcement agencies against international enforcement ef-
forts).
104. See id. at 156-57 (noting that existing international anti-narcotics activities
provided agencies such as the FBI with experience and opportunity to investigate
international terrorists activities).
105. See Federal Bureau of Investigation; Designation as Lead Agency to Com-
bat Terrorism, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,585, 11,585 (1990) [hereinafter Federal Bureau of
Investigation] (assigning the FBI to all international terrorism activities and inves-
tigations).
106. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
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agency investigating international and domestic terrorist acts, 07 thus
no longer rendering the agency an exclusively domestic counter-
terrorism institution.' 8 Accompanying its jurisdictional expansion,
the FBI's budget'" and activities"' have grown considerably to meet
the terrorist threat abroad."' As a result of this expanded authority of
a traditionally domestic law enforcement agency to combat terrorism
overseas, however, serious implications may arise as increased budg-
ets and activities among various agencies complicate strategies
against the threat of global terrorism." 1
2
107. See id.; see also Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 105, at 11,585.
This designation authorizes the FBI to:
Exercise Lead Agency responsibility in investigating all crimes for which it has pri-
mary or concurrent jurisdiction and which involve terrorist activities or acts in prepa-
ration of terrorists activities within the statutory jurisdiction of the United States.
Within the United States this would include the collection, coordination, analysis,
management and dissemination of intelligence and criminal information as appropri-
ate. If another Federal agency identifies an individual who is engaged in terrorist ac-
tivities or in acts in preparation of terrorist activities, that agency is requested to
promptly notify the FBI. Terrorism includes the unlawful use of force and violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian popula-
tion, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives....
Id.
108. See NADELMANN, supra note 37, at 150-56 (outlining the expansion of the
FBI's overseas terrorism activities).
109. See Counter-terrorism: Hearings on Counter-terrorism Before the Senate
Appropriations Comm., supra note 36, at 17-18 (1997) (statement of Louis Freeh,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (providing figures for the FBI's counter-
terrorism spending). In 1995, Congress appropriated $77.1 million to the FBI; in
1996, the FBI received $158.8 million for counter-terrorism activities, and in 1997,
Congress allocated $133.9 million in new antiterrorism resources. See id. at 12.
110. See FBI Oversight: Hearings Before Subcom. on Crime of the House Judi-
ciary Comm., 105th Cong. 33 (1997) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation) (explaining the expansion of the FBI to investigation
of terrorist use and the threat of weapons of mass destruction, intelligence gather-
ing and analysis, and the expansion of legal departments and training centers over-
seas). The FBI uses "Legates"-legal attach6 offices-to assist the FBI in
antiterrorist initiatives and coordinating activities with local police of other coun-
tries. See id. (noting the FBI's expansion of the Legates offices overseas and the
establishment of a law enforcement academy in Budapest, Hungry).
111. See id. (discussing the growing activities of law enforcement agencies to
meet the threat of international terrorism).
112. See generally infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text (providing analy-
sis of agency allocation of money and authority).
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C. THE SCOPE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT'S ANTITERRORISM
ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS
1. Status of Law Enforcement Antiterrorism Initiatives Abroad
The ever-present fear of a disastrous domestic or international ter-
rorist attack. 3 compels legislators to provide United States law en-
forcement agencies with unprecedented authority"' and money"' to
prevent terrorist acts." 6 Because the menace of terrorism impacts al-
most every aspect of society, numerous agencies besides those spe-
cifically charged with law enforcement are involved in counter-
terrorism programs." 7 These agencies implement a wide range of
counter-terrorism activities such as deterrence, prevention, support,
113. See 141 CONG. REC. S5841 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole) (proposing legislation in response to the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing);
see also 144 CONG. REc. S2938-39 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Domenici) (urging the Senate to pass legislation adapting the law to the changing
nature of the terrorist threat from abroad).
114. See Counter-terrorism Policy Hearings Before Senate Judiciary Comm.,
supra note 12 (discussing the expanded activities of the FBI overseas, including
intelligence gathering and international cooperation programs); see also Law En-
forcement Techniques, supra note 54 (noting that the FBI has expanded from a
primarily domestic law enforcement agency to an international law enforcement
agency).
115. See 141 CONG. REC. S5843 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (proposing an increase of SI.6 billion in appropriations for counter-
terrorism efforts in 1994-1995); see also Janet Hook, S500-Billion Budget Accord
Is Reached, L.A. TLMES, Oct. 16, 1998, at AI (noting that counter-terrorism initia-
tives would receive approximately S2.4 billion in 1999). This increase in spending
for antiterrorist activities is a response to the recent bombings in Kenya and Tan-
zania. See id. President Clinton plans to spend S 10 billion in counter-terrorism ac-
tivities for 2000, "including a tripling of FBI resources since 1993." Vernon Loeb,
Embassy Attacks Thwarted, U.S. Says; Clinton Seeks SJO Billiion to Fight Terror-
ism, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1999, at A2.
116. See Counter-terrorisin: Hearings on Counter-terrorism Before the Senate
Appropriations Comm., supra note 36, at 8 (setting forth FBI counter-terrorism ap-
propriations between 1995-1998, including the hiring of new agents and support
personnel).
117. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 26 (explaining that nu-
merous agencies are incorporated into the counter-terrorism strategy to deter and
disrupt destruction of telecommunication systems, transportation systems, electric
power systems, water supply systems, banking and financial systems, gas and oil
systems, and daily government operations).
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response, and crisis management."8 Additionally, these agencies of-
fer specialized capabilities and additional resources to law enforce-
ment, the coordination of activities among the agencies is essential
for successful antiterrorism efforts."9 Cooperation, however, is im-
paired by the lack of an adequate and accountable authority to over-
see and manage antiterrorism programs and activities.'20
Congressional initiatives and Presidential Decision Directives do
not produce meaningful policies for the coordination of agencies and
the implementation of effective strategies. 2' Moreover, funding and
resources for counter-terrorism programs are distributed without any
regards to prioritization of programs or evaluation of the success of
programs."' Duplicated antiterrorism ventures and overlapping
agency activities raise serious questions regarding possible jurisdic-
tional infringement,123 abuse, and miscalculation of the terrorist
threat. 124
118. See id. at 17-25 (listing the various agencies and their roles in fighting in-
ternational terrorism). For instance, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
("ATF") assists the FBI with explosive investigations. See id. at 43 n.3.
119. See General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Observations on
Crosscutting Issues (visited Dec. 24, 1998) <http://www.gao.gov/reports.htm>
(acknowledging that cooperation is paramount for domestic and international
counter-terrorism efforts).
120. See id. at 5 (observing that the National Security Council ("NSC") and Of-
fice of Management and Budget ("OMB"), as overseers of counter-terrorism pro-
grams and activities, do not require agencies to submit funding and spending data
on counter-terrorism programs). The NSC and OMB have not established priorities
for developing an effective strategy against terrorism, nor have they accounted for
interagency antiterrorism operations. See id.
121. See 144 CONG. REC. E1843 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Skelton) (asserting that there is a need for further cooperation among agencies and
that interagency problems must be worked out through legislation); see also Gen-
eral Accounting Office, supra note 119 (reporting a need for further refinement of
antiterrorism policy through Presidential Decision Directives).
122. See 144 CONG. REC. E717 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Skelton) (recognizing the existence of inefficiencies involving terrorism-related
funding, prioritization, and appropriations based upon GAO reports).
123. See General Accounting Office, supra note 119 (noting that coordination of
inter-agency activities raises issues involving jurisdictions among agencies).
124. See infra notes 173-188 and accompanying text (discussing possible impli-
cations of inefficient coordination among counter-terrorism agencies).
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The combined enterprises of approximately forty agencies fighting
international terrorism"- require clear appropriations legislation and
an accurate assessment of government spending and funding in rela-
tion to the threat and risk of terrorist activities." The consequences
of mismanaging and misprioritizing antiterrorism undertakings both
diminish deterrent measures against international terrorists and leave
the United States vulnerable to future attacks abroad.1
2
,
2. Relationship between Counter-terrorism Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Agencies
The FBI and CIA now lead the fight against terrorism abroad.' '
The potential for mismanagement and the lack of congressional
oversight of antiterrorism initiatives discussed above are particularly
relevant to these two agencies. 2 The FBI's global terrorism program
125. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 3 (providing the number
of agencies, departments, and bureaus combating terrorism at home and abroad).
126. See General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Spending on Gov-
ernment-wide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination, (visited
Oct. 24, 1998) <http:lwvw.gao.gov/reports.htm> (finding that, in 1997, there was
uncertainty regarding government spending and funding for antiterrorism activi-
ties). Counter-terrorism policies are in disarray because 1) agencies define
antiterrorism and counter-terrorism differently; 2) terrorism-related budget line
items are joint and not apportioned; 3) multiple functions of agencies create diffi-
culties allocating costs of terrorism-related activities; 4) amounts stipulated by ap-
propriations legislation are not identifiable; 5) and antiterrorism programs and ac-
tivities receive funds from different appropriations within the agency. See id. The
lack of accountable terrorism programs can lead to potential miscalculation of pri-
orities, misimplementation of policy and strategy, repetitive activities on the part
of agencies, or misallocation or gaps in spending. See id. at 3. This problem in-
vokes uncertainty of whether terrorist acts abroad, when classified as criminal acts,
amount to actions that are within the legal and practical scope and capacity of
agencies assigned to fight terrorism. See id. at 3-5.
127. See 144 CONG. REc. E717, E718 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Skelton) (warning that inefficiencies in counter-terrorism programs increase
the risk of a devastating international terrorist attack).
128. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 30, 53-54 (noting that the
CIA is primarily responsible for overseas intelligence gathering); see also id. at 39
(finding that the FBI, with the assistance of the Department of State, is the lead in-
vestigation agency for overseas terrorism).
129. See 135 CONG. REc. S8130, S8134 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Specter) (recognizing the need to coordinate policy between the two agencies
to avoid abuse and miscalculation).
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is responsible for investigating and preventing terrorist acts by
groups or individuals who are directed from abroad or whose activi-
ties cross national boundaries.'30 The CIA provides intelligence on
overseas terrorism, disrupts and penetrates terrorist activities, and
carries out covert operations against international terrorists.'3 ' Due in
part to inter-agency cooperative efforts, vague legislation resulting
from the full-scale attempt to prevent terrorism, and the increase in
the FBI's counter-terrorism abilities, the FBI continually overlaps
activities and traditional duties of other agencies, such as the CIA.'
For example, the FBI engages in international intelligence gathering
concerning terrorists, a role traditionally held by the CIA."' These
130. See Counter-terrorism Policy Hearings Before Senate Judiciary Comm.,
supra note 12 (explaining the role and activities of the FBI in combating interna-
tional terrorism); see also supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text (discussing
why the FBI is the leader of choice for international terrorism investigations).
131. See Intelligence for Law Enforcement: Statement on Intelligence Commu-
nity-Law Enforcement Cooperation Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence, 103d Cong. 63 (1995) (statement of Jeffery F. Smith, General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency) (stating that one of the roles of the CIA in interna-
tional terrorism intelligence activity is to coordinate efforts with law enforcement
agencies); see also Tim Weiner, The CIA Seeks Out Informers On Terrorism and
Finds Them, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at A2 (recognizing that the CIA must con-
centrate on intelligence and cooperate with other agencies' intelligence activities to
maximize the best options for the President in the fight against overseas terrorism).
132. See 139 CONG. REC. S13,410-13 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1993) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini) (recognizing that both the FBI and CIA are active in tracking and
monitoring international terrorist activities through intelligence). See generallv
General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 20-41 (delineating the cooperation
among agencies, departments and bureaus in combating international terrorism);
see also General Accounting Office, supra note 126, at 14 (suggesting that coop-
eration among counter-terrorism agencies is leading to an overlap in appropriations
committee jurisdiction, thus complicating spending and prioritizing issues); Wil-
liam R. Farrell, Assessing Counter-Terrorism Policy, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, supra note 7, at 289,
292-99 (assessing the implementation of counter-terrorism legislation and finding
that vague and ambivalent statutory language leads to complexity in implementa-
tion).
133. See S. REP. NO. 104-258, at 79-80 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3945 (describing the role of the CIA in intelligence gathering). The Brown Com-
mission found that CIA intelligence dealing with international activities with the
periodic cooperation of domestic law enforcement does not violate the National
Security Act, which prevents the CIA from infringing upon the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the FBI. See id. at 80 (explaining that although the expansion of the CIA is
a potential concern, the CIA is not a "secret police" in the United States).
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overlapping roles present a potential problem because the CIA,
which is statutorily forbidden to engage in domestic affairs,", acts in
close coordination with the primarily domestic institution, the FBI."
Furthermore, the organizational purposes and structures of both
agencies conflict with the idea of a joint counter-terrorism strategy.'
As a law enforcement agency, the FBI investigates crimes, collects
evidence, and arranges information for prosecution according to de-
tailed constitutional and statutory rules.'"' On the other hand, the CIA
does not disclose its activities to the courts, conduct overt operations,
or follow the same legal procedures as the FBI in preparing cases for
prosecution.' Although the FBI and CIA are experienced in over-
seas intelligence activities,'" the agencies' differing intrinsic meth-
ods of organization and procedure may impede the prosecution of
terrorists. Moreover, critics question whether either the FBI or the
CIA is the appropriate agency to wage the new war against interna-
tional terrorism. 4 ' Because both agencies conduct specialized activi-
134. See National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A. sec. 403(d)(3) (1988) (pro-
hibiting the CIA from conducting "police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers,
or internal security functions").
135. See 135 CONG. REC. S8130-31 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (remarking that the American public is wary of expanding intelligence
authority between the CIA and FBI and that there is a need to "adequately moni-
tor" these agencies' activities).
136. See Jonathan M. Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and
the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 336-38 (1998) (comparing
the roles of the FBI and CIA involving discovery in the prosecution of overseas
criminals).
137. See id. at 337 (summarizing law enforcement agencies' responsibilities for
a criminal investigation).
138. See id. (explaining that the CIA is less restrained by rules and procedures
that apply to the FBI and prosecution).
139. See generally Don Edwards, Reordering the Priorities of the FBI in Light
of the End of the Cold War, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 59, 66-72 (1991) (identifying
past FBI overseas intelligence activities).
140. Robert Cheseney, National Inecurin': Nuclear Material Availability and
the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMIP. L.J. 29, 79-80
(1997) (arguing that the CIA and FBI need to strengthen cooperative efforts to
overcome differences regarding intelligence gathering concerning weapons of
mass destruction); see also Fredman, supra note 136, at 337 (arguing that the FBI
and CIA engage in separate methods of investigating criminals abroad).
141. See Kopel & Olsen, supra note 20, at 332 (arguing that the FBI's expansion
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ties and have limited resources, neither agency alone may be fully
capable of combating the changing global terrorist threat. 
1 42
Nonetheless, the United States chooses to rely on both the CIA
and FBI to fight foreign terrorism by incrementally expanding and
adapting the roles of the CIA and FBI 43 to global political changes.'"
Because the threat of overseas terrorism is a national security prior-
ity, 4 1 the CIA and FBI are currently best situated to answer a terrorist
attack quickly because of their presence and experience abroad.1
46
Furthermore, a legal strategy against international terrorism has sig-
nificantly increased the involvement and importance of law enforce-
ment agencies, such as the FBI.147 The CIA's intelligence capabili-
ties, developed for Cold War intelligence gathering, are an essential
element for combating overseas terrorists activities. 48 Thus, policy-
makers attempt to respond immediately to the threat of international
overseas is not imperative, since the CIA has the ability and experience in operat-
ing overseas against terrorists); see also Law Enforcement Techniques, supra note
54 (debating whether the FBI or CIA is the proper agency for counter-terrorism
activities). Arguably, the FBI is better equipped and more experienced in handling
legal evidence in preparation for a criminal prosecution than the CIA. See id. On
the other hand, the CIA or the military might be the proper institution for a long
war against overseas terrorism, which is likened to low-intensity warfare. See id.
142. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text (discussing the changing
nature of international terrorism as a borderline war, possibly requiring more than
law enforcement and intelligence agencies can provide).
143. See Weiner, supra note 131 (noting that the CIA is using new methods and
seeking to expand CIA teams to combat terrorism); see also S. REP. No. 104-258,
at 80, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3945 (remarking on the combination of CIA
overseas terrorism intelligence and law enforcement agencies).
144. See generally Howard M. Shapiro, The FBI in the 21st Century, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 219, 222-24 (1995) (distinguishing the new purposes of the
FBI and CIA after the Cold War).
145. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text (identifying international ter-
rorism as the United States' highest national security threat).
146. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 30-32 (suggesting that
the cooperative efforts of current counter-terrorism agencies are sufficient to fight
terrorism abroad).
147. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
FBI against terrorism overseas).
148. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 30-31 (emphasizing the
need for CIA intelligence gathering against terrorism).
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terrorism by augmenting and conforming the present capabilities of
both the CIA and FBI.
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF EXPANDING LAW
ENFORCEMENT COUNTER-TERRORISM
ACTIVITIES
The United States is wholly committed to meeting the interna-
tional terrorist threat head-on, pouring tremendous amounts of re-
sources and energy into the counter-terrorism effort.'49 Accordingly,
the United States is expanding its extraterritorial jurisdiction so its
agencies can conduct increasing levels of law enforcement activities
against terrorism abroad. 50 While the expansion of proactive law en-
forcement activities is necessary, there are unfavorable consequences
of counter-terrorism activities that must be examined and mitigated
to maintain democratic principles and the rule of law.
A. RECIPROCITY AMONG NATIONS' LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTORS
One adverse legal implication of expanding the extraterritorial ju-
risdiction of United States law enforcement agencies overseas is the
potential for reciprocity.'5' Reciprocity suggests that foreign law en-
forcement actors will investigate possible terrorist acts committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States against foreign nationals,
property, or national interests.5 2 The concept of reciprocity limits
149. See supra notes 99-148 and accompanying text (delineating the United
States' commitment against international terrorism through its law enforcement
and intelligence agencies).
150. See generally supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text (outlining
antiterrorist legislation that extends the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United
States).
151. See FBI Authority To Seize Suspects Abroad, supra note 96, at 41 (state-
ment of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State)
(providing a context for the concept of reciprocity regarding counter-terrorism
policy). Another nation may use the United States' legal position against the
United States in the future, which may conflict with American interests. See id. at
41. For example, Russia, acting through the KGB, might conduct investigations in
the United States, in search of alleged terrorists, possibly without the consent of
the United States. See generally id. at 41-44.
152. See Kopel & Olsen, supra note 20, at 330 (commenting on possible impli-
cations of setting precedent under international law for allowing foreign law en-
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government actions abroad by restraining a nation from engaging in
activities that would otherwise negatively impact its national interest
if another state engaged in identical undertakings.'53 Thus, United
States law enforcement officials must consider their own actions
when combating terrorists overseas or face similar treatment by for-
eign officials investigating terrorist acts in the United States."4
Under the present law of the United States, for example, abduc-
tions are permissible against individuals who violate United States
law as long as they are located outside of the United States and pose
a significant threat to United States national security.' Because of
forcement agents into the United States to investigate crimes against their nationals
or property); see also Krohne, supra note 36, at 159 (suggesting the United States
could avoid reciprocity regarding foreign law enforcement investigations in the
United States if an International Criminal Court existed). But see Christopher A.
Donesa, Protecting National Interests: The Legal Status Of Extraterritorial Law
Enforcement By The Military, 41 DUKE L.J. 867, 892 (1992) (arguing that the reci-
procity argument does not carry practical weight in the international context for
two reasons). First, countries would not attempt to face the immense consequences
in violating United States sovereignty. See id. Second, the increase in international
cooperation between a nation's law enforcement actors leaves little need to resort
to the action of abduction. See id.
153. See Donesa, supra note 152, at 891-93 (suggesting possible limits that the
reciprocity argument would have on extraterritorial arrest). One limitation is that
the United States would weigh its policy interests and risks before attempting an
unpopular action, similar to other smaller, weaker nations. See id. at 897; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
sec. 102 cmt. b (1987) (stating that general and consistent practices of states can
result in international norms or legal obligations).
154. See generally Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: Amer-
ica's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151 (1991) (hy-
pothesizing a reciprocal action by the Iraqi government against an American busi-
nessman who is abducted and tried in Iraqi courts); Leslie McKay, Comment, A
New Take on Antiterrorism: Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 439, 458-59 (1997) (discussing the possibilities for reci-
procity in the context of allowing terrorist victims to sue their attackers civilly in
American courts).
155. See Arthur E. Shin, On The Borders of Law Enforcement-The Use of Ex-
traterritorial Abductions as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction Over The Interna-
tional Criminal, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 327, 330-35 (1995) (providing United States
doctrinal developments regarding international terrorism). The Ker-Frisbie Doc-
trine asserts that forcible abductions do not violate due process rights and do not
mandate that a court release an alleged offender for the violation of international
law. See id. at 334. The Supreme Court in United States v. Alveriz-Machain held
that the forcible abduction of a Mexican defendant did not deprive United States
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the new proactive stance adopted by the United States against inter-
national terrorism,"' fueled by a growing, lethal, and devastating in-
ternational threat,'57 the United States increasingly targets individuals
that pose a danger to national security."'8 These circumstances might
compel the United States to circumvent legal means of apprehension
and increasingly rely on illegal abductions to capture terrorists before
they strike. 9 By illegally abducting individuals abroad, the United
States potentially subjects itself to similar treatment where foreign
nations may attempt to abduct individuals on American soil. Abduc-
tions by foreign governments may include American law enforce-
ment officials who carry out illegal abductions in their territory,W or
courts of jurisdiction, nor did it violate the extradition treaty between Mexico and
the United States. See United States v. Alveriz-Machanin, 504 U.S. 655, 657
(1992); see also FBI Authority To Seize Suspects Abroad, supra note 95, at 61
(statement of William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Coun-
cil, United States Department of Justice) (stating that the President must make de-
cisions regarding national security and that the use of abductions by United States
law enforcement is a viable option).
156. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (observing a shift in Ameri-
can antiterrorism strategy from a reactive, punitive position to a proactive, preven-
tive strategy).
157. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text (asserting that an increase in
terrorism abroad and its lethality and destructiveness have prompted a more proac-
tive response by law enforcement agencies).
158. See Jerry Seper, U.S. Indicts bin Laden, Aide in Elnbassv Terror Bombings,
WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1998, at A3 (accusing Osama bin Laden of masterminding
terrorist bombing against the United States in Kenya and Tanzania). Bin Laden is
feared to have the capacity to aid international terrorists monetarily in their efforts
to strike United States targets. See id.
159. See FBI Authority To Seize Suspects Abroad, supra note 96, at 21, 61
(statement of William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Coun-
cil, United States Department of Justice) (suggesting that the use of abductions by
the United States under "compelling circumstances" is likely if national security is
threatened). Barr's statement is most applicable to the present circumstances re-
garding Osama bin Laden, whose capture the United States perceives as a matter of
self-defense. See id.
160. See id. at 61 (statement of William Barr, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Council, United States Department of Justice) (acknowledging that ab-
duction by a foreign nation of American law enforcement officials is possible); see
also NADELMANN, supra note 37, at 447-51 (comparing separate outcomes of ab-
duction cases involving American, Canadian, and Mexican law enforcement offi-
cials).
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individuals a foreign nation believes committed terrorist or criminal
acts against its government.
16
'
A proactive law enforcement strategy would not only increase the
likelihood of future reciprocity in the form of abductions, but may
also result in other reprisals by nations, further strengthening ani-
mosity toward the United States.6 1 Moreover, by illegally abducting
individuals from another country, the United States may endanger
future cooperative ventures in the fight against international terror-
ism, since such actions tend to strain relations between states.163
Thus, by abducting terrorists from abroad, the United States weakens
international norms and procedures,"6 and exposes itself to future
actions by foreign governments that are detrimental to the United
States' interests.
B. SOVEREIGNTY INFRINGEMENT
Seizures of suspected terrorists overseas by United States officials
arguably constitute a serious breach of the territorial sovereignty of
another nation and a violation of international law.'65 Sovereignty is
161. See Abramovsky, supra note 154, at 151-53 (noting the possibility that an-
other nation can abduct Americans on United States soil for crimes against that
nation); see also Beres, supra note 39, at 240 (arguing that the United States could
be accused by Cuba of harboring terrorists responsible for recent for acts of terror-
ism in Cuba).
162. See Nadelmann, supra note 15, at 871-72 (finding that countries react
negatively to the circumvention of extradition procedures, even when their own
country is involved in the abduction).
163. See Pregent, supra note 95, at 95-96 (considering the implications of ab-
ductions concerning future relations between states such as the United States and
Mexico). But see Shin, supra note 155, at 364 (arguing that the United States' use
of abductions may be the only course of action for obtaining criminals because of
international anti-American sentiments).
164. See Malloy, supra note 23, at 317 (arguing that unilateral actions lead to
reciprocity among nations, resulting in the diminished strength of international
law).
165. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, supra note 96, at 23, 31
(statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, United States Department of
State) (stating that unconsented international law enforcement activities are in
violation of sovereignty and international law); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES sec. 432 (noting that interna-
tional terrorism is a breach of international law and violation of sovereignty).
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one of the most fundamental attributes of international law.'6 Under
international law, the government of one country cannot conduct ac-
tivities in the territory of another country unless acting with the con-
sent of that nation.'67 Although the United States attempts to mitigate
sovereignty infringement through the use of extradition treaties" s and
international cooperative undertakings,' 69 the lack of oversight re-
garding the expansion of United States counter-terrorism efforts
overseas poses potentially serious problems." Abducting terrorists in
another country's territory by unauthorized law enforcement agents,
for example, infringes upon a nation's sovereignty and breaches in-
ternational law.'7 ' As with the creation of adverse reciprocal treat-
ment among nations toward the United States, the consequences of
infringing on the sovereignty of another nation may increase tension
between states and weaken the fight against overseas terrorism
through the use of international law.'n
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES see. 432(2) cmt. b (explaining that "[i]t is universally recognized
as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one state may not exercise their
functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent"); see also
FBI Authority To Seize Suspects Abroad, supra note 96, at 31 (describing sover-
eignty as "one of the most fundamental attributes of international law").
167. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES sec. 432 cmt. b (explaining the infringement of sovereignty).
168. See NADELMANN, supra note 37, at 398-401 (commenting on the preven-
tion of negative international responses to sovereignty infringement through the
use of multilateral written agreements).
169. See id. at 315 (providing examples of international law enforcement coop-
erative efforts). The United States and other foreign governments participate in in-
ternational cooperative efforts such as mutual legal assistance treaties, which rec-
oncile differences among nations on topics such as evidence gathering. See id.
170. See id. at 477 (stating that the infringement of sovereignty is the most
challenging issue facing the United States and other nations in the international
system).
171. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES sec. 432(2) (1987) (requiring consent for a state's law enforcement officers
to conduct activities within another state).
172. See Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Court for
the 21st Century, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 21-23 (1998) (identifying negative impli-
cations of sovereignty infringement under international law through the use of self-
help); see also Malloy, supra note 23, at 317 (asserting that countries' failure to
abide by existing international laws weakens the fight against terrorism abroad).
But see Kash, supra note 41, at 144 (arguing that the infringement of sovereignty is
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C. COMPROMISING AMERICAN PRINCIPLES
The internationalization of law enforcement activities also poses
potential concerns in the context of domestic law.17 The broad
authority and spending capacity allocated to law enforcement and
intelligence agencies by congressional initiatives produce growing
concerns among some policymakers that agencies will ignore laws
limiting their international activities, 74 particularly when there is a
perceived crisis. 75 Legislators fear that the FBI and intelligence
agencies involved in counter-terrorism activities are assuming un-
checked powers, which may possibly lead to abuse, miscalculation,
and a large, unfettered federal police power.1
76
The internationalization of law enforcement is the present trend to
fight terrorism abroad. Yet, gradual changes involving counter-
terrorism initiatives, such as the militerization of law enforcement, 
77
not a sufficient obstacle for conducting extraterritorial abductions).
173. See 135 CONG. REC. S8130, S8131 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Specter) (observing that overseeing activities of law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies is an essential duty of Congress); see also 144 CONG. REC. E1843
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Skelton) (noting that the expansion of
counter-terrorism agencies produce complications such as poor communications
and duplication of activities); 142 CONG. REC. E341-02 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Lofgren) (arguing that a proposed Comprehensive Death Pen-
alty and Antiterrorism bill would infringe on American constitutional rights); Ed-
wards, supra note 139, at 79-83 (introducing legislation limiting FBI counter-
terrorism investigation practices regarding American citizens). This legislation is
intended to curb broad, vague powers given to the FBI through Presidential Direc-
tives for terrorist investigations. See id.
174. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text (detailing the growth of
counter-terrorism law in enforcement activities overseas).
175. See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1992) (0'
Connor J., dissenting) (warning that the greatest dangers to our constitutional free-
doms come during times of crisis). Present concerns over international terrorism as
a crisis might provoke an overreaction by the government, thus expanding police
powers or law enforcement institutions.
176. See 135 CONG. REC. S8130, S8131 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Specter) (remarking on the possible ramifications of law enforcement prac-
tices regarding international terrorism); 142 CONG. REC. E341-02, (daily ed. Mar.
13, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (identifying possible consequences for
American individual rights as a result of the jurisdictional expansion of the FBI
overseas). Rep. Lofgren suggests that the FBI's international overseas capabilities
clash with the rights of individuals engaging in political activities. See id.
177. See Kopel & Olsen, supra note 20, at 269-70 (asserting that militerization
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the FBI's international intelligence capabilities," ' and the CIA's co-
operative efforts with domestic institutions,"9 may overlap too exten-
sively with domestic law enforcement, thus conflicting with prohibi-
tive laws.' Additionally, the lack of sound policy governing
counter-terrorism appropriations raises concerns in many policymak-
ers' minds that there is a need for counter-terrorism laws that limit
the growing power of counter-terrorism agencies."'
Unfettered United States international law enforcement activities
not only threaten to violate laws regulating the powers of agencies
fighting terrorism, but also compromise basic principles of tradi-
tional American law principles.8 2 Concerns among legislators and
scholars are growing regarding the possible sacrifice of Americans'
individual constitutional rights for the benefit of a swift counter-
terrorism response. 83 Foreign abductions, for example, do not com-
port with the American legal tradition. ' The Supreme Court, how-
of federal law enforcement has a trickle-down impact on law enforcement at the
state and local levels).
178. See Jim McGee, The Rise of the FBI, WASH. PosT, (Magazine), July 20,
1997 at W1O (questioning the expansion of FBI intelligence power).
179. See David M. Crane, Divided We Stand: Counterintelligence Coordination
Within The Intelligence Communit, of the United States, 1995-DEC APiY LAW.
26, 28-30 (1995) (differentiating the intelligence role of the CIA and FBI domesti-
cally and overseas).
180. See National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. sec. 401 (1994) (setting limits
for the CIA, such as restricting the agency from performing domestic intelligence
activities).
181. See Smith, supra note 66, at 278 (recognizing the possibility that Ameri-
cans' rights may be compromised by increasing the power of the FBI); see also
141 CONG. REc. S13,995-04, S14,045 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1995) (statement of Pre-
siding Officer) (commenting on the misprioritizing of FBI appropriations con-
cerning domestic and international terrorism); see also General Accounting Office,
supra note 126 (finding a lack of government spending priorities and accounting of
antiterrorism appropriations).
182. See Kopel & Olsen, supra note 20, at 330-31 (arguing that the internation-
alization of criminal lav presents similar challenges to federalizing criminal law).
183. See 142 CONG. REC. E341-02 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Lofgren) (stating that lawful assemblies supporting foreign groups were labeled by
cabinet officials because of their political views); see also McGee, supra note 178
(quoting Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) ("[Tihe FBI po-
tentially could be the most dangerous institution in the United States if its awe-
some powers are not held in check .... ").
184. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285 (1990) (Bren-
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ever, has also legitimized law enforcement authority and discretion
to act abroad by eliminating traditional procedural limitations of the
FBI. "'85 An instance in which the Court failed to promote principles of
American law"' was its decision to not extend Fourth Amendment
principles to searches of citizens of other countries by American law
enforcement officials abroad.'87
The potential for abuse of power among agencies fighting interna-
tional terrorism and the compromise of traditional American legal
principles on the world stage are cause for Congress to reevaluate
and reconsider legislation that establishes proper rules of conduct for
law enforcement overseas. Moreover, although the Supreme Court
acts deferentially toward activities in the international theater, the
Court must remain steadfast to protect against actions that violate
constitutional norms.188
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The existence of potentially negative implications of overexten-
sion of international counter-terrorism law enforcement powers
should encourage the United States to resolve these complex issues
on both a domestic and international level. At the same time, how-
ever, the United States must respond quickly to an increasingly lethal
nen, J., dissenting) (stating that "when United States agents conduct unreasonable
searches, whether at home or abroad, they disregard our Nation's values").
185. See id. at 259 (refusing to apply Fourth Amendment principles to law en-
forcement agents abroad).
186. See id. This case arose when Mexican law enforcement agents abducted a
suspected Mexican drug trafficker and murderer of a DEA agent and delivered him
to United States Marshall's in California. See id. Although there existed an extra-
dition treaty between the United States and Mexico, United States law enforcement
agents paid Mexican officials for the abduction and deliverance of Verdugo-
Urquidez. See Miller, supra note 37, at 872-74 (providing background facts of
Verdugo-Urquidez).
187. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75 (holding unreasonable searches
and seizures involving international circumstances does apply to non-resident
Americans). But see id. at 282 (Brennen J., dissenting) (arguing that United States
law enforcement must abide by constitutional principles since the United States is
itself a creature of the Constitution); Donsea, supra note 152, at 896 (arguing that
the decision in Verdugo-Uriquidez broadened the powers of law enforcement
abroad).
188. See Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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overseas terrorist threat by adapting and changing its present coun-
ter-terrorism strategy.'" The responsibility for changing the United
States' response to international terrorism lies not only with agencies
involved in the fight against terrorism, but also with Congress.'" To
begin mounting an effective counter-terrorism strategy, Congress
must develop comprehensive, well-reasoned legislation that ad-
dresses the changing nature of terrorism abroad.' 9'
A. REFORM LEGISLATION
A comprehensive counter-terrorism bill, enacted specifically for
and prior to international terrorist acts, would provide a foundation
for a consistent, cohesive counter-terrorism policy.'2 The new bill
should create a uniform counter-terrorism strategy by bridging gaps
among existing terrorism legislation, improving inter-agency coordi-
nation accountability, and setting forth clear, forward-looking objec-
tives. This new bill would integrate and compile all present terrorism
legislation, as policymakers would formulate a uniform strategy to
combat the new terrorist menace.' 93
The first issue that legislation must address is the clarification of
the definition of international terrorism.' " By eliminating ambiguities
189. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text (discussing how American
law enforcement's proactive response overseas is fueled by a growing, more dan-
gerous terrorist threat abroad).
190. See 144 CONG. REC. E1843 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Skelton) (urging Congress to unify antiterrorism strategy abroad and scrutinize and
evaluate counter-terrorism policies).
191. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 19 (finding no single fed-
eral law comprehensively addressing terrorism abroad).
192. See FBI's Role in Counter-terrorism Strategy, Hearings Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998), available in LEXIS online, Cong. Rec.
(commenting on the need for Congress to establish national objectives for fighting
overseas terrorism).
193. See 142 CONG. REC. E341-02 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (categorizing pres-
ent legislation as "a Christmas tree on which an assortment of amendments are
being hung"); see also Roberto Suro & Dana Priest, Plan to Overhaul
Antiterrorism Strategy Would Boost NSC's Role, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1998, at
A7 (considering the consolidation of all counter-terrorist activities under the
authority of the National Security Council Office).
194. See Beres, supra note 39, at 242-46 (suggesting that a clear definition of
international terrorism through a single set of standards prevents the incorporation
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resulting from the present definitions of international terrorism, the
United States can more accurately assess the overseas terrorist threat
and promote uniform, consistent activities among counter-terrorism
agencies.' Because the United States bases its response to terrorism
abroad on its law enforcement agencies, the standard definition
adopted should be that of the FBI's. The adoption of the FBI's defi-
nition would instill uniformity among counter-terrorism agencies,
produce clear, corresponding initiatives toward the accomplishment
of law enforcement goals, and set forth a consistent objective stan-
dard for determining terrorist acts.'96
Second, thoughtful, narrowly tailored legislation would promote
effective counter-terrorism policies and prevent potential legal con-
flicts among agencies by properly allocating funding and authority.'97
For the United States to confront international terrorism, agencies as-
signed to the task must have a clear understanding of their authority
and purpose.'98 Congress should establish a governmental agency re-
sponsible for government-wide collection and review of funding
data, assessment and the prioritization of antiterrorism activities, and
coordination and evaluation of current antiterrorism initiatives.'99
of discrepant activities).
195. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 16 (noting that different
agencies and departments do not share a universal definition for international ter-
rorism, nor a term to describe counter-terrorism programs). Agencies practice di-
vergent activities according to separate agendas regarding the same objective. See
id. at 16 (comparing the Department of Defense with the FBI regarding agency
antiterrorism objectives); see also General Accounting Office, supra note 126
(finding that ambiguity regarding the assessment of the international terrorist threat
has an adverse impact on antiterrorism funding and spending).
196. See supra notes 38-63 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a
consistent, universal international terrorism definition).
197. See General Accounting Office, supra note 126 (concluding that the lack of
a single governmental agency to oversee international terrorism activities has led
to misappropriation of funds and the overlapping of agency roles).
198. See 135 CONG. REC. S8130, S8131 (daily ed. Jan., 1989) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (arguing that if Congress does not state clear goals and objectives fighting
international terrorism, law enforcement and intelligence agencies will lack clear
objectives as well); see also FBI's Role in United States Counter-terrorism Strat-
egy, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 192 (1998) (noting
that Congress does not presently have clear understanding of national objectives
regarding a international terrorism strategy).
199. See General Accounting Office, supra note 126 (recommending better
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Without a governmental body performing such duties, agencies' ac-
tivities and spending will not be sufficiently tailored to fight a
changing global terrorism threat.2 °
B. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Although these recommendations address some changes in law
and policy, they do not completely resolve issues regarding sover-
eignty infringement or the consequence of reciprocity under interna-
tional law. If the United States proceeds with nonconsensual, unilat-
eral extraterritorial activities and utilizes its law enforcement
capacities within the territory of another nation, problems will
arise.20' In an effort to mitigate the probability of infringement upon
the territorial integrity of other nations and the possibility of recipro-
cal treatment, the United States should explore international coop-
erative efforts, such as prosecution of terrorists before the Interna-
tional Criminal Court ("ICC") or the strengthening of present
extradition treaties.0 2
Participation in the ICC would increase cooperation with other
nations, lessen extradition problems, and foster cooperative law en-
forcement relationships with nations in apprehending and prosecut-
ing transnational terrorists.2 ' The ICC might accomplish these ob-
jectives by ensuring fair, unbiased criminal proceedings of
international terrorists based on a uniform set of rules." Moreover,
these proceedings would be legitimized by the participation and con-
management and coordination among governmental agencies).
200. See General Accounting Office, supra note 43, at 16-20 (recommending a
reevaluation of combating the international terrorist threat in relation to agencies'
capabilities).
201. See generally Nadelmann, supra note 22, at 41 (discussing possible out-
comes of infiinging upon a nation's sovereignty).
202. See MacPherson, supra note 172, at 46-47 (suggesting the use of an ICC to
assist in prosecuting international terrorists); see also NADELMANN, supra note 37,
at 468-70 (observing successful international cooperation programs that avoided
pitfalls of sovereignty infringement).
203. See MacPherson, supra note 172, at 46-47 (noting the benefits of an ICC).
204. See id. at 58-59 (asserting that an international court would replace com-
plexities and barriers associated with nations obtaining jurisdiction and prosecuting
overseas terrorists).
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sent of each nation and the establishment of laws and definitions of
criminal acts falling within the jurisdiction of the Court.05
Furthermore, cooperation among nations' international law en-
forcement agencies with those of the United States through mutual
assistance programs2° will lessen friction among law enforcement
systems, decrease the use of abductions as a necessary alternative,
and increase the effectiveness of law enforcement techniques such as
evidence gathering and apprehending suspected terrorists. 07 The
United States should promote cooperation through universally-
accepted principles, processes, and instruments such as the United
Nations and extradition treaties.0 8
CONCLUSION
Because of the changing threat of international terrorism, the
United States must take a more provocative, preemptive stance
against terrorists abroad. Since the first line of defense against a ter-
rorist attack is our law enforcement agencies, Congress must take the
initiative and provide these agencies with the essential guidance and
means necessary for a successful counter-terrorism strategy. In doing
so, law enforcement and intelligence agencies can avoid the adverse
ramifications of fighting well-armed and well-supported terrorists
overseas. Furthermore, the increasing budgets and activities of
counter-terrorism agencies require Congress to enact legislation that
uniformly defines international terrorism and establish a government
body for overseeing agency initiatives. Before sending our men and
women overseas and committing our resources to this new war, we
must have clear objectives and coordinated implementation so our
205. See id., at 51-53 (outlining essential elements for an effective ICC).
206. See Malloy, supra note 23, at 317 (arguing that international cooperation
that includes the United States will strengthen international law).
207. See NADELMANN, supra note 37, at 469-77 (discussing possible results of
increasing international law enforcement overseas).
208. See Blaine Harden, Clinton Urges Global Unity Against Terrorism, WASH.
POST, Sept. 22, 1998, at A13 (urging countries' law enforcement units to work co-
operatively through international agreements and institutions). President Clinton
recently acknowledged the need to use international institutions and instruments,
such as the United Nations and Global Antiterrorism Conventions, to facilitate co-
operative efforts among Western and Islamic States. See id.
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law enforcement agencies can promulgate a successful strategy
against terrorists.
